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NOTES
OLD HURDLES HAMPER NEW OPTIONS FOR
BATTERED IMMIGRANT WOMEN
INTRODUCTION
Isabel Cristina Rodriguez de Ramos is a native and citizen
of Mexico.' She came to the United States in 1988 with her
boyfriend, Jesus Ramos. While Jesus previously obtained law-
ful permanent resident ("LPR") status2 as a seasonal agricul-
tural worker, Isabel has remained an undocumented (illegal)
alien.' Isabel and Jesus married in July 1990, and have sub-
' In re Isabel Cristina Rodriguez de Ramos, Oral Decision of the Immigration
Judge, File No. A 29 999 700 (Jan. 2, 1996) [hereinafter Oral Decision Rodriguez).
Isabel Cristina Rodriguez de Ramos is a client of the Immigration and Human
Rights Clinic, Bexar County Legal Aid of San Antonio, Texas. She was denied
suspension of deportation under the immigration provisions of the Violence Against
Women Act ("VAWA"), which is part of the Violent Crime Control and Law En-
forcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, subtit. G, 108 Stat. 1796, 1953
(1994) (codified in various sections of Titles 8, 18 and 42 of the US. Code), be-
cause she failed to meet the continuous presence requirement demanded by the
VAWA. Oral Decision Rodriguez, supra, at 7. The immigration judge, nevertheless,
granted her relief under traditional suspension of deportation provisions based on
her abuse. Oral Decision Rodriguez, supra, at 9. The Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service ("INS") has subsequently appealed this decision, seeking to deny
Isabel relief altogether. Brief for Appellant, In re Isabel Cristina Rodriguez de
Ramos, File No. A 29 999 700 (Apr. 22, 1996). For a more extensive discussion of
suspension of deportation, see infra Part IL
2 Lawful permanent resident status, which is acquired by petition for a resi-
dent alien card (1-551 or "green card"), 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (1994), grants individuals
numerous rights in the United States including indefinite legal residence. Id.
§ 1101(a)(20). LPRs have "immigrant" status as opposed to visitors with temporary
visas, like students, tourists and business persons, who have anon-immigrant"
status. Id § 1101(a)(15).
I Oral Decision Rodriguez, supra note 1, at 3. Undocumented aliens are a
class of "unlawfully present" individuals who have not been properly admitted to
the United States. 8 U.S.C.A § 1251(a)(1)B) (West Supp. 1997). In order for
aliens legally to enter the United States, they must obtain either an immigrant or
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sequently had three children.4 Following the birth of their first
child, Jesus began verbally attacking Isabel. This verbal abuse
later escalated into physical assaults.' Jesus has also
threatened Isabel with a gun and a knife, forced her to stay at
home, and abused her and their children economically by not
paying for rent or food.6
Battered immigrant women in Isabel's situation face enor-
mous barriers hindering their escape from violence. As bat-
tered spouses, these women confront partners who use physi-
cal, sexual and psychological abuse, as well as isolation, intimi-
dation and economic abuse to exert power and control over
their wives.' For battered immigrant women, their subjugation
non-immigrant visa from a consulate prior to embarkation. 8 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994).
Aliens granted visas are permitted to travel to the United States. Id. §§ 1201,
1184. Visas, however, do not guarantee entry. At the border the INS inspects
individuals to determine whether they should be admitted. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225
(West Supp. 1997). The INS considers nine grounds for inadmissibility. Id.
§ 1182(a). These grounds include: (1) health related concerns; (2) criminal activity;
(3) security concerns; (4) public charge classification; (5) labor certification and
qualifications; (6) illegal entrance and immigration violations; (7) documentation
deficiencies; (8) ineligibility for citizenship; and (9) miscellaneous grounds, including
polygamy and child abduction. Id.
Prior to April 1, 1997, individuals inspected at a U.S. port or border, who
failed to meet any of the nine inadmissibility grounds, were placed into exclusion
proceedings ("exclusion"). 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1994). Similarly, aliens who entered the
United States and were found to be deportable under § 1251(a) were subject to
deportation proceedings ("deportation"). Id. § 1252. Under the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208,
div. C, tit. III, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (to be codified in various sections of Ti-
tles 8, 18, 28 and 42 of the U.S. Code), Congress replaced exclusion and deporta-
tion with one process, removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a (West Supp. 1997).
Removal proceedings are initiated when the INS issues a "notice to appear" to
the alien. Id. § 1229(a). Aliens are then given an opportunity to secure counsel.
Id. § 1229(b). Removal proceedings are conducted before an immigration judge who
determines the inadmissibility or deportability of the alien. Id. § 1229a(a). In re-
moval proceedings, it is the alien's burden to prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence that they are not inadmissible, or that they are lawfully present. Id. §
1229a(c).
The Attorney General, in her discretion, may cancel the removal of inadmissi-
ble or deportable aliens and adjust their status to lawful permanent residents; or
the Attorney General may allow such aliens to voluntarily depart from the United
States without the prejudice of a removal order on their immigration record. Id.
§ 1229b.
Oral Decision Rodriguez, supra note 1, at 3.
Oral Decision Rodriguez, supra note 1, at 3-4.
6 Oral Decision Rodriguez, supra note 1, at 3-4.
See Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce: Constraints
and Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319, 333-36 (1997) (discussing coercive
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in abusive relationships has been compounded by U.S. immi-
gration law which gives control over an alien's legal status to
her U.S. citizen ("USC") or LPR spouse.8 Consequently, an
abusive spouse can condition sponsorship of his wife's petition
for lawful permanent residence on her remaining in the abu-
sive relationship.9 Battered immigrant women have thus been
left to make an impossible choice: live with their abusers in
tactics batterers use to assert control, including: undermining a partner's sense of
herself, social and economic isolation; terrorism (slashing tires, threatening family
members, stalking); and sexual abuse).
' This Note deals with alien women present in the United States who are
seeking immigrant status through the relative-petition process or cancellation of
removal. Many of these women have come to the United States to join their USC
or LPR spouses.
Aliens seeking immigrant status through the relative-petition process can
generally be separated into two categories: (1) immediate relatives of USCs, 8
U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2) (1994); and (2) preference immigrants, id. § 1153. There are
four preference categories: first preference immigrants include unmarried children
of USCs, id, § 1153(a)(1); second preference immigrants include spouses or children
of LPRs, id § 1153(a)(2); third preference immigrants include married children of
USCs, id. § 1153(a)(3); and fourth preference immigrants include siblings of USCs
(if the USC is over 21 years of age), id. § 1153(a)(4). While immediate relatives
are not subject to immigrant visa quotas, see i& § 1151(b), preference immigrants
are limited by numerical restrictions. rL § 1153.
The relative-petition process involves two parts: First, the sponsoring relative
files a petition (1-130) with the INS to classify the alien as an immediate relative
or preference immigrant. Id. § 1154. Second, if the INS approves the petition, the
alien files an application (1-485) with the INS to adjust his or her status to lawful
permanent resident. I § 1255. Adjustment of status is a procedure designed to
alleviate the traditional burden imposed on aliens present in the United States
who would otherwise have to return to their home country in order to obtain an
immigrant visa.
In order for the INS to adjust an alien's status, an immigrant visa must be
available. Id. § 1255(a)(3). Allocation of immigrant visas are determined by the
immigration preference system. Id. § 1153. Immediate relatives of USCs avoid this
requirement because they are not subject to immigrant visa quotas. Id. § 1153(a).
Immediate relatives, therefore, can apply for adjustment of status at the same
time they file their relative-petition. All other aliens, including spouses of LPRs,
must wait for visa availability. Id. § 1255. These aliens receive a "priority date
when they file their petition, which is based on their preference category and the
date they file their petition. Id. § 1152; 8 C.F.R. § 204 (1996); see AUGUSTIN
FRAGOMEN ET AL., IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 11-97 (1997). The priority
date places them in line for an immigrant visa. When the priority date becomes
"current," the alien is eligible to adjust his or her status to lawful permanent resi-
dence. See FRAGOMEN, supra, at 11-97. This process can take years.
' See H.IR REP. No. 103-395, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1993) (stating that
"[c]urrent law fosters domestic violence in such situations by placing full and com-
plete control of the alien spouse's ability to gain permanent legal status in the
hands of the citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse.").
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the hope of gaining legal status, or escape from their abusers
and risk deportation." For this reason, many immigrant
women, who could otherwise overcome the physical, psychologi-
cal and economic abuse, are trapped in abusive relationships
for fear of deportation.
Confronting this predicament, President Clinton signed
into law the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") on Sep-
tember 13, 1994." Under the VAWA, battered immigrant
women can self-petition for lawful permanent residence instead
of depending on their abusers' sponsorship. 2 The legislative
history of the VAWA makes clear that "[tihe purpose of permit-
ting self-petitioning is to prevent the citizen or resident from
using the petitioning process as a means to control or abuse an
alien spouse." 3
The VAWA also provides an immigration remedy for wom-
en who's deportation would be an extreme hardship--"cancella-
tion of removal."" When Congress passed the VAWA, this
remedy fell within the Immigration and Nationality Act's
("INA") "suspension of deportation" provisions, and thus was
referred to as the VAWA suspension of deportation." Cancel-
lation of removal supersedes suspension of deportation through
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"). 16 This Note uses "suspension of depor-
tation" when referring to cases that arose prior to IIRIRA."7
1" See Janet M. Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The Legacies of Cover.
ture, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 593, 613 (1991) (adding that battered immigrant wom-
en also risk "deprivation of home, livelihood, and ability to promote a child's best
interests" should they attempt to leave their abusive relationships).
" Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified in various sections of Titles 8, 18 and
42 of the U.S. Code).
2 The VAWA immigration provisions are codified in 8 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1154(a)(1)(A)-(B), 1229b(b)(2) (West Supp. 1997). Sections 1154(a)(1)(A) and (B)
contain the VAWA self-petition provisions referred to in the text. Under the
VAWA immigration provisions, battered alien children can also acquire lawful per-
manent residence through the petition of their alien parent or through their own
self-petition. Id. § 1154(a)(1)(A)-(B); see infra Part II for a description of the self-
petition process under the VAWA immigration provisions.
13 H.R. REP. No. 395, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1993).
14 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b)(2) (West Supp. 1997).
" 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254(a)(3) (West Supp. 1996).
i The traditional suspension of deportation requirements, as well as the can-
cellation of removal requirements, are outlined infra Part II.
17 Suspension of deportation, in fact, remains effective for cases filed prior to
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By creating the self-petition and cancellation of removal
options through the VAWA, Congress has made tremendous
strides towards remedying pitfalls in U.S. immigration policy
that have shackled immigrant women to abusive relationships.
In spite of these legal advances, the goals of the VAWA self-
petition and cancellation of removal provisions may be lost in
their application. Just as judicial application has stymied other
well-intended laws to help abused women,18 administrative
and adjudicative hurdles'9 may hamper Congress' initiative to
liberate battered immigrant women from domestic violence.
Problems may arise in application if immigration adjudica-
tors fail to consider abuse-related factors when evaluating
VAWA claims."0 Unlike other applicants for legal status, bat-
tered women confront unique circumstances that affect their
ability to meet conventional immigration standards routinely
applied by immigration adjudicators. For example, adjudicators
might normally disregard loss of community support services
IIRIRA.
1i See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Miscon-
ceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 383 (1991) (assert-
ing that "the most common impediments to fair trials for battered women are the
result not of the structure or content of existing law but of its application by trial
judges."). Id.
The Attorney General oversees the governmental bodies responsible for immi-
grant administrative and adjudicative review--the INS and Executive Office of
Immigration Review ("EOIR"), respectively. Under the INS, administrative applica-
tions, like VAWA self-petitions and other visa applications, are reviewed. 8 C.F.R.
§ 2.1 (1996). The EOIR, on the other hand, adjudicates applications for relief from
deportation, such as cancellation of removal, asylum and other adversarial cases.
Id. § 3.10.
2 James A. Jones, Comment, The Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments:
Sham Marriages or Sham Legislation?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 679, 697-98 (1997)
(suggesting that the "greatest impediment" for VAWA self-petitioners is INS discre-
tion to evaluate the weight of evidence supporting VAWA claims). The importance
of considering abuse-related factors also arises in cases which involve battered
women who kill their abusers. Without considering the circumstances of abuse,
judges have denied valid self-defense claims. Since State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548
(Wash. 1977), a case involving a woman who killed an alleged child molester be-
cause of her belief that he posed an imminent danger, courts have begun to ex-
amine more thoroughly the circumstances which give rise to violent acts. See State
v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J. 1984) (commenting on the battered woman's syn-
drome, the court explained that [olnly by understanding these unique pressures
that force battered women to remain with their mates, despite their long-standing
and reasonable fear of severe bodily harm and the isolation that being a battered
woman creates, can a battered woman's state of mind be accurately and fairly
understood.").
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as a measure of extreme hardship. But for battered women,
these support services enhance their ability to flee and to re-
cover from abuse. In one of the first VAWA suspension of
deportation cases, In re Rivera-Gomez,22 an immigration judge
ignored abuse circumstances-which otherwise would have
demonstrated the applicant's deportation hardship-when he
rejected her VAWA claim.'
Recognizing the risk that adjudicators may overlook the
violence that VAWA claimants face, the INS promulgated regu-
lations which direct immigration adjudicators to consider "evi-
dence arising from circumstances surrounding abuse."24 The
regulations underscore that "any credible evidence" must be
considered in the evaluation of VAWA self-petition and cancel-
lation of removal claims.' Nonetheless, regulations cannot
guarantee the action of adjudicators. To maximize the impact
of the VAWA and its interpretive regulations, the INS should
train adjudicators to frame VAWA evaluations in the context of
abuse.
The challenge to escape abuse does not end with the
VAWA-battered immigrant women must also overcome eco-
nomic hurdles. Indeed, a battered woman's poverty not only
makes her financially dependent on her abuser, but may also
prevent her from taking advantage of legal outlets like the
VAWA.
This Note explores the significance of including abuse
circumstances in the evaluation of VAWA immigration claims.
Part I examines the nature of power and control dynamics in
abusive relationships and discusses how U.S. immigration
policy leading up to the VAWA reinforced the cycles of abuse.
2 See infra Part III.A for a discussion of abuse-related extreme hardship fac-
tors. Cf Elizabeth M. Schneider & Susan B. Jordan, Representation of Women Who
Defend Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 WOEI.N's RTS. L.
REP. 149 (1978) (explaining that circumstances of abuse must be considered when
evaluating self-defense claims by battered women who kill their abusers).
' In re Rivera-Gomez, Oral Decision of the Immigration Judge, File No. A 70
922 256 (June 5, 1995) [hereinafter Rivera-Gomez Oral Decision].
Id. at 13-16.
24 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(viii) (1997). An interim rule issued on March 26, 1996,
listed specific abuse-related factors to be used by immigration adjudicators. 61 Fed.
Reg. 13061 (1996); see infra Part IIIA.
8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(viii). The "any credible evidence" standard is also delin-
eated in the VAWA immigration provisions. 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1154(a)(1)(H), 1254(g)
(West Supp. 1996).
[Vol. 62: 1595
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Part H outlines the VAWA self-petition and cancellation of
removal provisions. Part M analyzes residual obstacles that
persist for VAWA applicants if immigration adjudicators fail to
consider abuse factors in their VAWA evaluations. This Part
also contemplates how an abused alien's poverty may create
economic hurdles that prevent her from utilizing VAWA's im-
migration provisions and financially fetter her to an abusive
husband. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996' is highlighted in this discussion
as a new hurdle that reinforces economic challenges. The Note
concludes that in spite of VAWA's liberating potential, failure
to consider abuse factors will undermine VAWA's implementa-
tion.
Only by tailoring VAWA requirements to address the
unique circumstances of abuse, along with training adjudica-
tors to consider these factors, will the VAWA meet Congress'
intent to open doors for battered immigrant women. Moreover,
to ensure VAWA's success, Congress must remove the econom-
ic hurdles that keep battered immigrant women from leaving
abusive relationships.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Dynamics of Abuse
When Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act, it
recognized the enormous and devastating impact that domestic
violence plays in the lives of millions of American women.'
Over one-quarter of married couples experience domestic vio-
lence.' One-third of these experiences involve serious as-
saults such as punching, kicking and hitting, as well as attacks
6 Pub. L. No. 104-193, tit. IV, 110 Stat. 2260 (1996) (to be codified in various
sections of Titles 8 and 42 of the U.S. Code).
27 H. REP. No. 395, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1993) (noting that "[ain e3ti-
mated four million American women are battered each year by their husbands or
partners. Approximately 95% percent of all domestic violence victims are women.
About 35% of women visiting hospital emergency rooms are there due to injuries
sustained as a result of domestic violence.").
23 ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WoMEN KILL 4 (1987).
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with knives or guns.29 Indeed, violence committed by an in-
timate partner is more likely to result in injury than violence
perpetrated by a stranger.30
The roots of domestic violence in our legal system and
social structure can be traced back to the coverture doctrine, a
centuries-old precept which declares that, upon marriage, a
wife's identity merged with her husband's. 1 According to the
coverture doctrine, a woman's legal identity ceased to exist
after marriage, when she became her husband's chattel.32
Moreover, to exert power and control over his wife, a husband
had the "right of chastisement," a legal privilege condoning
spousal abuse.33 In fact, the "rule of thumb"-a rule allowing
husbands to beat their wives with sticks no broader than a
thumb-is based on the chastisement law.34 While much of
the facade and some of the substance of coverture have washed
away with time, the underlying principles of coverture persist
in modern society."
2 Id. (finding that these figures are much higher for women who have recently
separated or divorced, two-thirds of whom reported violence in their former rela-
tionships).
30 Id. at 5 (citing the 1980 National Crime Survey which found that over one-
half of attacks committed by strangers resulted in injury, while three-fourths of
those committed by intimates caused injury).
31 1 wILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COIENTARIES 442 (1783), laying the foundation of
the coverture doctrine, stating:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in the law: that is,
the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the
marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every
thing-, and is therefore called ...a ferne-covert, . . . is said to be covert-
baron, or under the protection and influence of her husband, her baron,
or lord; and her condition during her marriage is called her coverture.
Janet Calvo in Legacies of Coverture, supra note 10, uses the framework of cover-
ture in her discussion of U.S. immigration policy. This framework is discussed
further infra Part I.B.
32 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 31.
See Beirne Stedman, Right of Husband to Chastise Wife, 3 VA. L. REG. 241,
243 (1917); see also Calvo, supra note 10, at 597 (noting that "[a] husband's total
control over his wife's livelihood, home, and children created a coercive situation
which was reflected in a subsidiary doctrine, the right of 'chastisement.'").
3 Stedman, supra note 33, at 243.
3 Substantively, the American legal system has retained the precepts of cover-
ture and has buoyed the principle that "a man's home is his castle." Perhaps the
most blatant incorporation of coverture in our legal system is interspousal immuni-
ty. At common law, interspousal immunity barred a wife from bringing a tort
action against her husband. Douglas Scherer, Tort Remedies ,br Victims of Domes-
[Vol. 62:1695
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The concept on which the coverture doctrine is based-that
women belong to or are property of their husbands-promotes
the power and control dynamics that shape abusive relation-
ships. To ensure their domination, batterers employ a variety
of manipulative tactics, which include physical, psychological
and economic abuse, as well as intimidation, coercion and
threats.36 The violence encountered by battered women has
also been likened to that experienced by captives or prisoners
of war." Cycles of humiliation and degradation followed by
acts of kindness are tools used by both batterers and captors to
demoralize and weaken their prisoners.s Additionally, like
other victims of severe trauma, battered women respond to the
reality of abuse by focusing on self-protection and survival."
Continued victimization results in feelings of powerlessness,
vulnerability, loss of control and self-blame."
Furthermore, a batterer seeks to isolate his spouse socially
and economically in order to bolster his power and control.4 '
Battered women are often forced to stay at home.42 Attempts
tic Abuse, 43 S.C. L. REV. 543, 561-63 (1992). Since the wife's legal identity, ac-
cording to the coverture doctrine, merged into that of her husband, any lawsuit
she raised became his. Thus, an action for battery by a wife against her husband
was equivalent to an action by a husband against himself. Id. at 562. This ratio-
nale prevented women from challenging abuse through civil legal recourse. Al-
though most states have rejected interspousal immunity, the sentiment behind the
immunity-that spouses should be immune from actions against each oth-
er--continues.
28 See Dalton, supra note 7, at 333-36.
'T BROWNE, supra note 28, at 125 (noting that fplarlles ... exist between
the principles of brainwashing used on prisoners of war and the experiences of
some women in battering relationships.").
8 BROWNE, supra note 28, at 125; see LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED
WOAuN SYNDROME 27-28 (1984) (citing Amnesty International's psychological tor-
ture definition now used to assess domestic violence cases).
29 BROWNE, supra note 28, at 123.
BROWNE, supra note 28, at 123, stating that
emotional reactions of victims of assault include fear, anger, guilt, shame;
a feeling of powerlessness or helplessness such as is experienced in early
childhood; a sense of failure, and a sense of being contaminated and
unworthy. Experiences of personal attack and intrusion, such as rape,
often lead to acute perceptions of vulnerability, loss of control, and self-
blame. During a personal assault, the victim may offer little or no resis-
tance, in an attempt to minimize the threat of injury or death. Again,
the emphasis is on survival.
' See Dalton, supra note 7, at 334-35.
See Dalton, supra note 7, at 334.
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to make friends and develop relationships are met with anger
and escalated violence. Batterers also prevent their wives from
pursuing employment and gaining financial independence."
For immigrant women, their isolation is exacerbated by
the lack of available resources and their inability to speak
English and obtain lawful employment." Often, information
immigrant women receive about their legal rights is filtered
through their abusive spouses.45 In addition, many immigrant
communities consider domestic violence a private issue and
castigate women who openly confront their husbands' abusive
behavior.4" To discuss abuse publicly brings shame and dis-
grace to the family.4' The separation of private and public is-
sues in these communities accentuate the isolation and captiv-
ity which battered immigrant women experience.
Domestic violence not only harms the physical, psychologi-
cal and emotional well-being of abused spouses, but injures
their children as well. Studies indicate a substantial correla-
tion between spouse abuse and child abuse.48 Children are
both directly and indirectly affected by domestic violence. In
' See Dalton, supra note 7, at 334 (stating that "[blatterers often mount fierce
campaigns to keep their partners from attending school or taking a job."). Dalton
notes that destroying professional wardrobes, giving partners a black eye, intrud-
ing at work or school, and failing to show up to take care of the children are
among the measures batterers use to isolate their partners. Dalton, supra note 7,
at 334.
" Chris Hogeland, Immigrant Women in United States History, in DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE IN IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE COMMUNITIES: ASSERTING THE RIGHTS OF
BATTERED WOMEN at V-2 (Deeana Jang et al. eds., 1991). See infra Part III.C.2
for a brief discussion of work authorization acquisition.
"5 Leslye E. Orloff et al., With No Place to Turn: Improving Legal Advocacy for
Battered Immigrant Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 313, 323 (1995).
41 Margaret R. O'Herron, Ending the Abuse of the Marriage Fraud Act, 7 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 549, 559 (1993).
' Id. Illustrating the difficulties faced by immigrant women who must make
private issues public in order to confront their abuser, OHerron quotes Tina Shum
at the Cameron House, a shelter for abused women:
Confrontation is completely against what is taught in Asian culture. The
girl may receive great pressure from relatives against her going forward
to complain. Even her own parents may not take her back if she divorces
her husband. Just to find the opportunity and courage to call us
[Cameron House] is an accomplishment for many.
Id.
Lee H. Bowker et al., On the Relationship Between Wife Beating and Child
Abuse, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 158, 159-61 (Kersti Yllo &
Michele Bograd eds., 1988).
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many homes where a man beats his wife, he also beats his
children.49 Moreover, some studies show that children, by sim-
ply witnessing abuse, experience significant emotional harm
that may result in post-traumatic-stress disorder."
The public's denial of responsibility for domestic vio-
lence-premised on the belief that domestic violence is a pri-
vate, family issue-encourages male power and control and
legitimizes violence against women."1 Modern manifestations
of coverture, though, are not limited to the private realm. The
vestiges of coverture persist in some areas of American juris-
prudence, notably in U.S. immigration law.
B. Coverture in U.S. Immigration Law
In her article, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The Lega-
cies of Coverture, Janet Calvo persuasively introduces the cov-
erture framework as a means for understanding the challenges
posed by U.S. immigration law for battered immigrant wom-
en. 2 The discussion below uses this framework to review past
U.S. policies and to explore new immigration laws as well.
Although many states have sought to end coverture
through Married Women's Property Acts-statutes designed to
give married women the legal right to own property-the
"' Naomi P, Calm, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic
Vrwolence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REv. 1041, 1056 (1991) (identi-
fying one study that found that in over 70% of the families where there is spouse
abuse there is also child abuse); see Bowker, supra note 48, at 161, presenting the
hypotheses that:
(1) Children of battered wives are commonly abused by their fathers. (2)
The more severe the wife abuse, the more severe the child abuse. (3) The
higher the degree of husband-dominance in a violent marriage, the more
severe the child abuse. (4) The more extensive the father's experiences
with violence in his family of origin, the more likely he is to move from
wife abuse to child abuse.
'o See Dalton, supra note 7, at 335-36; see also Cahn, supra note 49, at 1056.
See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973,
983-85 (1991) (exploring the idea that the public's identification of intimate vio-
lence as a "private" issue not only allows the public to deny responsibility for such
acts, but also is an "affirmative political decision ... [that) plays a particularly
subtle and pernicious ideological role in supporting, encouraging and legitimating
violence against women").
2 See Calvo, supra note 10.
5W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAi OF TORTS
§ 122, at 902 (5th ed. 1984).
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remnants of coverture continue to permeate U.S. immigration
law.54 Disparate treatment of immigrant women is evident in
the first restrictions on immigration imposed in the later part
of the nineteenth century. These restrictions excluded undesir-
able individuals, such as criminals and prostitutes, and those
with physical or mental illness. Alien wives, whose legal status
depended on their USC or LPR husbands, were sometimes
exempt from these restrictions." Nevertheless, in 1922 Con-
gress passed the Cable Act,55 which prevented USC or LPR
wives from sponsoring their alien husbands.57 Moreover, un-
der the Cable Act, female citizens who tried to sponsor their
alien spouses could lose their own citizenship.58
Since the 1920s, however, there have been several at-
tempts to remedy the unequal treatment of women in immigra-
tion law. A July 11, 1932, congressional act recognized a
woman's right to sponsor her alien husband by allowing her to
support her husband's lawful permanent resident application if
the marriage took place prior to July 1, 1932."9 This law was
later extended to marriages that took place prior to 1948.60 A
more significant step toward equality in spousal sponsorship
came with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. In the
process of consolidating prior immigration policy and establish-
ing the foundation of modern immigration law, the INA fur-
thered the goal of family unification by protecting both hus-
bands and wives from exclusionary quotas.6 Thus, any USC
or LPR has the right to sponsor his or her alien spouse. None-
theless, this law has failed to alleviate the harsh consequences
5' See Calvo, supra note 10, at 606-13.
5 See Hogeland, supra note 44, at V-3; Calvo, supra note 10, at 601-02.
56 Act Relative to the Naturalization and Citizenship of Married Women, Pub.
L. No. 67-346, ch. 411, 42 Stat. 1021 (1922); see Hogeland, supra note 44, at V-3.
" See Hogeland, supra note 44, at V-3 (citing C.Y. Yu, The World of Our
Grandmothers, in MAKING WAVES 33 (Asian Women United of California ed.,
1989)).
Hogeland, supra note 44, at V-3.
5' Calvo, supra note 10, at 603 (explaining that "an alien husband of a United
States citizen became eligible for admission into the United States as a non-quota
immigrant, but only if the marriage occurred prior to July 1, 1932") (citing Act of
July 11, 1932, Pub. L. No. 277, § 4(a), 47 Stat. 656).
' Calvo, supra note 10, at 603 (citing Act of May 19, 1948, Pub. L. No. 538,
§ 4(a), 62 Stat. 241).
" Calvo, supra note 10, at 603-06 (citing Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 166).
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for battered immigrant women who still depend on their hus-
bands for spousal sponsorship. Indeed, the INA only equalized
the ability of USC or LPR women and men to exert power over
their alien spouses through the sponsorship process.' As dis-
cussed below, subsequent immigration legislation has contrib-
uted to an abuser's domination in violent relationships.
C. The Immigration and Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986
and the Immigration Act of 1990
The Immigration and Marriage Fraud Amendments of
1986 ("IMFA7)' further entrenched USC and LPR control
over their alien spouses." Congress passed this legislation to
halt sham marriages created by aliens seeking to circumvent
other more cumbersome and prohibitive avenues for obtaining
immigrant status in the United States.' The IMFA alters the
spousal sponsorship process by making conditional the perma-
nent resident status of aliens who have been married for less
than two years at the time of becoming lawful residents.'
The conditional status may be removed after a two-year test
period by a subsequent joint petition filed by the alien and his
or her spouse.' During this time, the INS reserves the right
to interview the married couple to ensure the validity of the
marriage.' If the couple's union survives the two-year test
period, the alien spouse may be given lawful permanent resi-
dence.
' It is not uncommon for USC and LPR spouses to blackmail their alien
spouses by threatening to withdraw sponsorship of their spouses' relative-petitions
for lawful permanent residence. Although some USC and LPR spouses may re-
quest money, batterers, as discussed above, may condition spousal sponsorship on
their wives remaining in abusive relationships.
Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537 (1986) (codified in various sections of
Title 8 of the U.S. Code).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a (1994).
Ignatius Bau & William R. Tamayo, Immigration Marriage Fraud Amend.
ments of 1986 (Marriage Fraud Act) and Other Related Issues, in DO3)ESTIC
VIOLENCE IN IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE COMMUNITIES: ASSERTING THE RIGHTS OF
BAT ERED WOMEN at VII-1 (Deeana Jang et aL eds., 1991).
8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1), (g)(1) (1994).
7 Id. § 1186a(c). The joint petition is filed on an 1-751 form and requires docu-
mentation demonstrating that the marriage is bona fide. Id.
IId. § 1186a(b). The Attorney General may terminate the marriage if she
finds that it was entered into for the purpose of acquiring immigrant status or if
the marriage is judicially annulled or terminated. Id.
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Unfortunately, the conditional period provides abusers
with greater opportunity to control their wives. Before the
1986 amendments, battered spouses were subject to coercion
prior to gaining immigrant status, but were freed from this
manipulation once LPR status was granted. Under the IMFA,
abusers can still control their wives even after initial immi-
grant status has been granted because of its conditional na-
ture.69
Two limited waivers included in the 1986 amendments
may relieve some alien spouses from the spousal sponsorship
requirement once they have acquired conditional residence. °
The first waiver offers relief if the alien spouse demonstrates
that deportation would result in extreme hardship." Although
Congress requires a liberal construction of the extreme hard-
ship waiver, 2 "extreme hardship" in other contexts is narrow-
ly defined.73
Narrow interpretations of extreme hardship can be devas-
tating for battered women relying on this waiver."4 For exam-
"9 Calvo, supra note 10, at 613.
70 8 C.F.R. § 216.5 (1996).
8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(A) (1994).
72 S. REP. No. 491, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 8 (1986). See infra note 76 for exam-
ples of the broad range of factors that could be included in a liberal interpretation
of the extreme hardship standard.
"' See INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (holding that the Attorney General
has the discretion to define narrowly the criteria of "extreme hardship"). The
Wang case involved the suspension of deportation claim of a Korean family. The
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding that the extreme hard-
ship requirement could be satisfied if the alien produces sufficient evidence to sug-
gest that "hardship from deportation would be different and more severe than that
suffered by the ordinary alien who is deported." Wang v. INS, 622 F.2d 1341,
1346 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 450 U.S. 139 (1981); see In re Anderson, 16 I. & N.
Dec. 596 (1978) (identifying factors to consider when evaluating extreme hardship).
Factors to be considered include: (1) age of subject; (2) family ties in the United
States and abroad; (3) length of residence in the United States; (4) health condi-
tions; (5) political and economic conditions in country of origin; (6) financial status;
(7) possibility of adjustment through other means; (8) utility to United States or
community; (9) immigration history; and (10) position in community. Id. at 597
(citation omitted); cf Hernandez-Cordero v. United States INS, 783 F.2d 1266,
1268 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that extreme hardship should take into account the
specific circumstances of each case).
", Janet Calvo argues that extreme hardship should be evaluated differently in
waiver petition cases than in suspension of deportation cases because the two
remedies address different circumstances. Calvo, supra note 10, at 636. Suspension
applies to individuals "either in illegal status or [who] are permanent residents
who have participated in activity that makes them deportable." Calvo, supra note
[Vol. 62:1595
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ple, one INS official asserts that extreme hardship only applies
to suffering once deported.7' According to this view, a
woman's past suffering bears no relationship to future hard-
ship.76 Thus, the abuse suffered by women who seek to use
this waiver would be irrelevant. The second waiver created by
the IMFA allows a woman to obtain permanent residence if
she entered the marriage in good faith and the USC or LPR
spouse dies or the marriage ends in divorce or annulment."
The Immigration Act of 1990 ( MIMACTT  ')7 added a third
waiver to the joint petition requirement-the battered spouse
waiver.7" The battered spouse waiver may be granted if the
beneficiary wife shows that the marriage was entered into in
good faith and that she or her child was battered or subject to
10, at 636. The extreme hardship waiver involves aliens who have obtained legal
status, "but whose marriages did not last for two years, or whose spouse is using
his power over immigration status as a means of control? Calvo, supra note 10, at
636.
Calvo, supra note 10, at 610.
; Cf Calvo, supra note 10, at 610, stating that
[t]his approach ignored the extreme hardship inherent in a battering
situation. If deported, a battered alien spouse could not pursue criminal
or divorce proceedings against her abuser. She could not continue the
health care and counseling needed to recover from the abuse. Deporting
her would force her to go to a place where she may not have legal or
physical protection from the battering spouse or be stigmatized because of
having been battered. Deportation of a battered spouse would heap addi-
tional extreme trauma on a person who has been subjected to the har-
rowing experience of violence in her own family at the hands of an indi-
vidual from whom she expected love and affection.
Calvo also remarks that this view ignores congressional intent, which stipulated
that the extreme hardship waiver apply to alien spouses abused by a citizen or
resident spouse. Calvo, supra note 10, at 610.
77 8 U.S.C. § 1186(c)(4)B) (1994). Originally, the good faith waiver could only
be utilized if the alien spouse terminated the marriage for good cause and was
not the one responsible for failing to file a joint petition. This prerequisite placed
the abused spouse in the precarious situation of confronting the man from whom
she was trying to escape at the most dangerous juncture of the relation-
ship-separation. See BROWNE, supra note 28, at 110 (noting that "some estimates
suggest that at least 60 percent of women who leave their abusers are followed
and harassed or further attacked by them."); see also Calvo, supra note 10, at 610-
11.
This limitation was removed by the Immigration Act of 1990, which permits
the waiver even if the husband terminates the marriage. See Deborah Weissman,
Protecting the Battered Immigrant Woman, 68 FLA. B.J. 81 (1994).
"' Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified in various sections of
Title 8 of the U.S. Code).
79 8 U.S.C. § 1186(c)(4)(C) (1994).
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extreme cruelty by her spouse." Waivers based on physical
abuse must be supported by clear evidence, including documen-
tation such as police or physicians' reports, affidavits from so-
cial service workers or school officials, or other official re-
ports.8
1
Although the IMFA and the IMMACT waivers partially
remedy the additional hurdle imposed by the IMFA conditional
residence status, the waivers do not entirely save alien wives
from abusive husbands. Battered immigrant women, according
to the IMFA, must still rely on their husband's sponsorship to
obtain initial immigrant status. As discussed below, the VAWA
is a leap forward for alien spouses, who, under this law, can
individually pursue permanent resident status.
II. THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT
The VAWA makes an enormous step toward eradicating
the vestiges of coverture in immigration law.82 Two new out-
so Id.
81 Note that the extreme cruelty component of this waiver is limited to aliens
who suffer mental abuse. Affidavits from licensed professionals are required to
support extreme cruelty waivers. See O'Herron, supra note 46, at 555-59 (discuss-
ing evidentiary requirements for IMMACT's battered spouse waiver).
82 Perhaps most striking about the VAWA is its timing. At this juncture in
American history, it is surprising that the federal government has passed legisla.
tion which eases immigrant access to the United States. As today's political cli-
mate demonstrates, politicians, searching for targets to blame for American eco-
nomic woes, make scapegoats of voiceless and disenfranchised immigrants. See
Roberto Suro, White House Pressured by Immigration Politics, WASH. POST, Mar.
28, 1994, at Al.
Riding this anti-immigrant wave, both Congress and the President have initi-
ated efforts to curtail the flow of immigration and enforce deportation of illegal
aliens. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
supra note 3 (tightening border controls, enhancing enforcement against deportable
aliens, increasing deterrence of alien smuggling, eliminating suspension of deporta-
tion); Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, §§ 440-43, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (limiting the rights of aliens with criminal
records); Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, supra note 26
(restricting access to public benefits for lawful permanent residents).
Given this anti-immigrant trend, passage of the VAWA immigration provisions
is all the more impressive and illustrative of the drive in this country to improve
the lives of battered women. In addition to its immigration provisions, the VAWA
provides a host of remedies for victims of violence motivated by gender. As stated
in the Senate report, the goals of the VAWA are "both symbolic and practical":
IT]he act is intended to educate the public and those within the justice
system against the archaic prejudices that blame women for the beatings
[Vol. 62: 1595
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lets are provided by the VAWA for battered immigrant women,
children, and alien parents of battered children: self-petition
for lawful permanent residence, and cancellation of removal.s
Unlike the waivers outlined in the IMFA and the IMMACT,
the self-petition and cancellation of removal provisions do not
require any participation on the part of abusers. Abusive hus-
bands, under the VAWA, can no longer bind their alien spous-
es in violent relationships by withholding sponsorship of their
wives' resident applications during either the initial applica-
tion period or the conditional residence period.
Gaining immigrant status as a VAWA self-petitioner is a
two part process." First, the applicant must show that she is
eligible to receive an immigrant visa by filing a self-petition (I-
360).' To qualify as a self-petitioner, the VAWA requires a
battered immigrant to show that she: (1) is the spouse of a
USC or LPR; (2) is a person of good moral character; (3) is
classifiable as an immediate relative or is a spouse of an LPR;
and (4) has resided in the United States with her spouse.'
The alien's petition may be approved by the Attorney General
if she demonstrates that: (1) she currently resides in the Unit-
ed States; (2) she entered her marriage in good faith; (3) she or
her child was battered or subject to extreme cruelty by the
USC or LPR spouse during the marriage; and (4) she or her
child would suffer extreme hardship if deported.'
and the rapes they suffer, to the women the suppoit and the assurance
that their attackers will be prosecuted; and to ensure that the focus of
criminal proceedings will concentrate on the conduct of the attacker rath-
er than the conduct of the victim.
S. REP. No. 138, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1993). Thus, the VAWA acknowledges
on a national level the government's responsibilities to battered women. Through
the VAWA the government provides crucial program funding, essential mechanisms
to improve police protection, and creates a civil rights remedy. rd. at 48.
8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1154(a)(1)XA), (B), 1229b(b)2) (West Supp. 1997).
This process modifies the standard relative-petition process used by aliens
who rely on their spouse's petition. See supra note 8.
5 The 1-360 is used instead of the 1-130, which is the form used by spouse
sponsors. Memorandum from T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Commissioner, Immigration
and Naturalization Service, to INS Regional Directors, District Directors, Service
Center Directors and Officers in Charge, at 2 (Apr. 16, 1996) [hereinafter
Aleinikoff Memorandum].
8 U.S.CA. § 1154(a)(1)(A), (B) (West Supp. 1997).
Id- Similar requirements apply to alien children who self-petition. See id.
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Second, along with filing a self-petition the alien must also
apply to adjust her status to lawful permanent resident."
This step is no different than the standard procedure followed
for aliens with approved relative-petitions. 9 Adjustment of
status is contingent on the availability of visas.'0 Because of
their classification as immediate relatives, alien spouses of
USCs need not wait for visa availability. These spouses can
adjust their status as soon as their self-petition is approved.9
Spouses of LPRs, however, may have to wait several years for
visas to become available. This occurs when their "priority
date"-placement on the visa waiting list-becomes "cur-
rent.
92
While the VAWA self-petition option is available to anyone
regardless of their immigration status, the VAWA cancellation
of removal provision is specifically designed to protect inadmis-
sible or deportable aliens for whom deportation would be an
extreme hardship.93 If an alien is granted cancellation of re-
moval, she will be allowed to stay in the United States indefi-
nitely and will have her immigrant status immediately adjust-
ed to lawful permanent resident. 4
When Congress passed the VAWA, it softened what were
the traditional suspension of deportation requirements for
cases involving battered immigrant women. At the time of
VAWA's enactment, suspension of deportation relief required
more than seven consecutive years of presence in the United
States, a showing of good moral character, and a demonstra-
tion that deportation would be an extreme hardship to the
alien or his or her legal spouse, parent or child.95
To qualify for the VAWA cancellation of removal, however,
a battered immigrant woman must be: (1) deportable under
any law of the United States except for marriage fraud; (2)
physically present in the United States for three consecutive
8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1994). See supra note 8 for a description of the adjustment
of status process.
See supra note 8 for a description of the relative-petition process.
8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1994).
91 Id. § 1151(b)(2).
See Aleinikoff Memorandum, supra note 85, at 2-3.
8 U.S.CA. § 1229b(b)(2) (West Supp. 1997).
9' Id. § 1229b(b)(3).
9' 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
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years; (3) a victim of battering or extreme cruelty by a USC or
LPR spouse or parent; (4) a person of good moral character;
and (5) a person whose deportation would result in extreme
hardship to the alien, the alien's parents or children.'
Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act,' cancellation of removal provisions super-
sede and tighten suspension of deportation requirements for
non-VAWA applicants." In spite of these more stringent re-
quirements, IIRIRA preserves VAWA's softer provisions.'
IERIRA maintains VAWA's three-year presence require-
ment"0 while lengthening the burden for all other cancella-
tion applicants.' IIRIRA also keeps VAWA's extreme hard-
ship requirement 2 while heightening the traditional suspen-
sion standard.' 3 Congress' preservation of VAWA's provisio-
ns-in the face of escalating attacks on immigrants-undersco-
res Congress' intent to protect battered women.
A number of battered women have already benefited from
the VAWA self-petition and cancellation of removal options.
Despite these successes, the VAWA immigration provisions do
not ensure that battered women will receive relief. As men-
tioned earlier, VAWA claims may be denied if adjudicators fail
to incorporate in their VAWA evaluations abuse factors which
demonstrate the unique challenges confronting battered immi-
grant women.
96 8 U.S.CA. § 1229b(b)(2) (West Supp. 1997).
Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, tit. I1, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (to be codified
in various sections of Titles 8, 18, 28 and 42 of the U.S. Code).
8 U.S.CAL. § 1229b (West Supp. 1997).
9 Id- § 1229b(b)(2).
0 Id. § 1229b(b)(2)(B).
101 Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(A) (requiring ten years of continuous residence in the Unit-
ed States).
1'2 I& § 1229b(b)(2)(E).
= 8 U.S.CJA § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (demanding that aliens show "exceptional and ex-
tremely unusual hardship" to the alien's USC or LPR spouse, parent or child). Not
only does the new law remove an alien's ability to rely on "extreme hardship to
herself-as was the case prior to IIIRA, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254(a)(1) (West Supp.
1996)-now aliens can only qualify for this form of deportation relief by demon-
strating the effects of deportation on a USC or LPR relatives, 8 U.S.C.A. §
1229b(b)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1997). If an alien does not have lawful U.S. relatives,
she may not qualify for cancellation of removal.
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III. APPLICATION OF THE STANDARDS
While the VAWA uproots the remnants of coverture in
immigration law, the strengths behind its provisions may be
lost in its application. The immigration provisions lay the
groundwork for battered immigrant women to escape abusive
relationships without the fear of deportation. However, if adju-
dicators ignore circumstances of abuse in their application of
the VAWA provisions, Congress' intent to protect battered
spouses may be thwarted.
To illustrate VAWA's limitations, a divorced battered wom-
an cannot self-petition if her divorce took place prior to fil-
ing.'0 4 This no-divorce requirement presents substantial risk
to battered immigrant women..5 who may need a divorce to
protect themselves and their children." 6 Furthermore, under
the VAWA, an abusive husband can endanger his spouse's self-
petition and perpetuate his control by threatening a divorce.
Likewise, the VAWA's evidentiary requirements create
conflicts for self-petitioners and suspension of deportation
claimants."' Battered women who attempt to document their
good faith marriages and the legal status of their husbands
may be hindered by angry and uncooperative spouses. Efforts
to obtain such documentation-in light of a separation with
the batterer-heightens the risk of abuse.0 '
0 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(ii) (1997); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(ii) (West
Supp. 1997) (stating that self-petitions are available to an "alien who is the
spouse" of a USC or LPR). However, the INS will review self-petitions of divorced
battered immigrant women if they filed the self-petition before getting divorced. 8
C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(ii). The VAWA suspension of deportation does not contain this
bar. See Aleinikoff Memorandum, supra note 85, at 6.
1" See Janet Calvo, The Violence Against Women Act: An Opportunity for the
Justice Department to Confront Domestic Violence, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 485,
488 (1995).
1" Id. at 488-89 (explaining that a battered spouse may need a divorce in order
to obtain custody and to end "the relationship that serves as the basis for abuse").
10, See Memorandum from the National Network on Behalf of Battered Immi-
grant Women to Amy Jeffress (May 23, 1995) (on file with author) (generally dis-
cussing evidentiary issues in battered immigrant women proceedings); see also
Jones, supra note 20, at 694-95 (noting that VAWA's implementing regulations
give "the INS sole discretion to determine what evidence is credible and what
weight to give that evidence").
1.. See BROWNE, supra note 28, at 115 (noting that women are at greatest risk
of serious injury when they separate from their abusers); cf Aleinikoff Memoran-
dum, supra note 85, at 5-7 (recognizing "the difficulties some self-petitioners may
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By focusing on the extreme hardship and good moral char-
acter requirements, the discussion below explores the inherent
problems with applying the VAWA immigration standards
without considering the violence that VAWA claimants con-
front. This section also addresses how an abused woman's
poverty may impede her VAWA claim and frustrate her ability
to escape abuse even if she gains legal status.
A. The Extreme Hardship Standard
The VAWA immigration provisions require self-petitioners
and cancellation of removal applicants to demonstrate that
their deportation will result in extreme hardship to themselves
or their children." 9 Generally, the U.S. attorney general has
the discretion to determine how applicants can meet the ex-
treme hardship standard."0 Narrow interpretations of ex-
treme hardship, which ignore abuse factors, may deny battered
women the opportunity to present the strongest evidence sup-
porting their VAWA claims. One of the first adjudicated VAWA
suspension cases, In re Rivera-Gomez,"' demonstrates this
concern. In Rivera-Gomez, an immigration judge denied the
applicant's suspension of deportation claim by narrowly con-
struing acceptable extreme hardship evidence, which excluded
abuse-related factors."
Ms. Rivera, a Salvadoran woman, fled from her country in
August 1991,"' when death squads threatened her life be-
cause of her political affiliation with Salvadoran guerrilla forc-
es." 4 Soon after her arrival in the United States in Septem-
ber 1991, Ms. Rivera began living with Raul Salinas, a lawful
permanent resident."' She eventually married him in
experience in acquiring documentation, particularly documentation that cannot be
obtained without the abuser's knowledge or consent"). The Aleinikoff Memorandum
adds that INS officials should aid self-petitioners by checking "[readily available
electronic" and other INS records. Aleinikoff Memorandum, supra note 85, at 5.
9 8 U.S.C-A §§ 1154(a)(1)(A), (B), 1229b(b)2)(E) (West Supp. 1997).
11 See INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1980).
.. Rivera-Gomez Oral Decision, supra note 22.
1 Rivera-Gomez Oral Decision, supra note 22, at 13-16.
. Rivera-Gomez Oral Decision, supra note 22, at 4.
.. Rivera-Gomez Oral Decision, supra note 22, at 4-10.
"I Transcript of Hearing at 26, In re Rivera-Gomez, File No. A 70 922 256
(June 2, 1995) [hereinafter Rivera-Gomez Transcript].
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1994.116 Throughout their relationship, Mr. Salinas both
physically and psychologically abused Ms. Rivera."7 He also
sought to intimidate her with death threats and threats of
deportation should she report him to the police.' Mr.
Salinas limited her involvement with the community and re-
acted violently to her attempts to become involved."' After
she went to a community service agency to get immigration
information, Mr. Salinas accused Ms. Rivera of dating the
interviewer. 21 Ms. Rivera eventually received a civil protec-
tion order and filed charges of spouse abuse against her hus-
band.12
1
While the immigration judge conceded that the applicant
had met the three-year residence requirement, 22 had proved
abuse," and had shown good moral character, 24 he reject-
ed her VAWA suspension claim on the grounds that she failed
to demonstrate that deportation would cause her extreme
hardship." The judge based his decision on the fact that Ms.
Rivera is capable of applying her employment skills "anywhere
in the world," and is not faced with political threats in her
country of origin.126 In reaching this conclusion, the im-
, Id.
117 Id. at 27, 29-30.
. Brief for Appellant at 10, In re Rivera-Gomez, File No. A 70 922 256 (June
2, 1995) [hereinafter Appellant's Briefl (the brief was filed by the Central Ameri-
can Resource Center ("CARECEN"), counsel for the appellant).
" Id. at 11.
120 Id. at 11-12.
121 Id. at 12.
1 Rivera-Gomez Oral Decision, supra note 22, at 12.
'2 Rivera-Gomez Oral Decision, supra note 22, at 12.
124 Rivera-Gomez Oral Decision, supra note 22, at 13 (though finding that the
applicant made "very willful deceptions and very willful false statements and very
large exaggerations in her asylum application").
1" Rivera-Gomez Oral Decision, supra note 22, at 13-16.
126 Rivera-Gomez Oral Decision, supra note 22, at 13-16. The applicant also pre-
sented asylum and withholding of deportation claims. See Rivera-Gomez Oral Deci-
sion, supra note 22, at 2-3. The immigration judge denied these claims as well,
holding that the applicant had neither demonstrated a well-founded fear of perse-
cution required for asylum nor the likelihood of persecution demanded for with-
holding of deportation. See Rivera-Gomez Oral Decision, supra note 22, at 11-12.
As a supporter of Salvadoran guerrillas, the applicant participated in political and
social activities of the Salvadoran rebel group at her university and church. She
also provided medical assistance to the rebels. Rivera-Gomez Oral Decision, supra
note 22, at 4. In March of 1991, the applicant had a bomb thrown at her. The
assailants throwing the bomb shouted her name. Rivera-Gomez Oral Decision,
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migration judge ignored abuse factors which would have shown
the unique and extreme hardship experienced by Ms.
Rivera. 27
The immigration judge merely followed a traditional, nar-
row interpretation of the extreme hardship standard. Accord-
ing to the U.S. Supreme Court holding in 1IVS v. Wang,'
"[t]he Attorney General and his delegates have the authority to
construe 'extreme hardship' narrowly should they deem it wise
to do so. "m The attorney general considers the following lim-
ited factors when evaluating extreme hardship: age; family ties
in the U.S. and abroad; health conditions; economic and politi-
cal conditions of the country to which the alien is returnable;
financial status-business and occupation; the possibility of
other means of status adjustment; whether the alien is of spe-
cial assistance to the United States; position in the community;
and the alien's immigration history."
In recognizing that these traditional standards are too
narrow to encompass the unique manifestations of extreme
hardship in abusive relationships, the INS promulgated regu-
lations which direct adjudicators to consider abuse circum-
stances and "any credible evidence" that may support a VAWA
claim.1 The regulations encourage self-petitioners "to cite
and document all applicable factors ... [and underscore that]
there is no guarantee that a particular reason or reasons will
result in a finding that deportation would cause extreme hard-
ship."
13 2
supra note 22, at 6. She subsequently went to hide in her aunt's village. Rivera-
Gomez Oral Decision, supra note 22, at 8. Later, the applicant was also shot by
army personnel. Rivera-Gomez Oral Decision, supra note 22, at 9. The immigration
judge ultimately denied the applicant's asylum and withholding of deportation
claims on the belief that she was lying. Rivera.Gomez Oral Decision, supra note
22, at 10.
Rivera-Gomez Oral Decision, supra note 22, at 13-16.
450 U.S. 139 (1981).
Id. at 145. By supporting a narrow reading of extreme hardship, the Su-
preme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's lenient construction of the standard. The
Ninth Circuit suggested that "suspension of deportation will be granted to the
alien for whom the hardship from deportation would be different and more severe
than that suffered by the ordinary alien who is deported." Wang v. INS, 622 F.2d
1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
13 In re Anderson, 16 I. & N. Dec. 596, 597 (1978).
m 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(viii) (1997).
1 2i
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The interim rule of March 26, 1996 also lists a number of
abuse oriented factors that may serve as a basis for demon-
strafing extreme hardship.133 These factors instruct adjudica-
tors to consider: (1) the nature and extent of the physical and
psychological consequences of the abuse suffered by the peti-
tioner; (2) the loss of access to U.S. courts and the criminal jus-
tice system; (3) the unavailability in the country of deportation
of needed social, medical, mental health and support services;
(4) the laws, social practices, or customs in the country of de-
portation that would castigate the self-petitioner for leaving
her husband or taking action to stop the abuse; (5) the abuser's
ability to travel to the country of deportation to harass the
self-petitioner and the willingness of public officials in that
country to protect the petitioner; and (6) the likelihood that the
abuser's family or friends in the country of deportation will
harass the self-petitioner on behalf of the abuser."
The extreme hardship factors listed in the INS interim
rule reflect those outlined in the Rivera-Gomez appellant's
brief ("appellant's brief'). 3 ' While the factors are not identi-
cal, appellant's discussion of these factors provides a model
framework for evaluating extreme hardship in the abuse con-
text. The brief underscores that the immigration judge's "deci-
sion makes little or no mention of any of the factors related to
the VAWA provision. This incomplete and distorted analysis
violated the congressional intent behind VAWA.""3 '
Appellant's brief describes five abuse-related, extreme hardship
factors." 7
First, appellant's brief underscores that the nature and
extent of abuse suffered by battered women like Ms. Rivera is
analogous to that of prisoners of war. 3' For three and a half
13 61 Fed. Reg. 13061, 13067 (1996).
,3' Id.; see Orloff, supra note 45, at 327 (suggesting additional factors to consid-
er for extreme hardship evaluation, which include: the batterer's economic capabili-
ty to travel to the country of deportation; the danger posed by the abuser's rela-
tives in the country of deportation; the impact of family separation on children of
the abused mother; the effect of deportation on pending child custody, child sup-
port, and visitation proceedings; and the hardship on children deported with their
alien mother).
"5 Appellants Brief, supra note 118, at 16-32.
... Appellants Brief, supra note 118, at 16.
13 Appellant's Brief, supra note 118, at 16-32.
138 Appellant's Brief, supra note 118, at 23.
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years, Ms. Rivera's husband attacked her physically and psy-
chologically.139 He punched her in the face, chest, arms and
legs and did not stop the abuse when she became preg-
nant.' He also threatened to kill her if she reported him to
the police."" While this pattern of abuse demoralized Ms.
Rivera, she has begun the fragile process of reasserting control
over her life.42 In this context, deportation would only frus-
trate her efforts to recover.'
Second, appellant's brief highlights that deportation would
cause Ms. Rivera extreme hardship by severing her ties to
community support services.1" Ms. Rivera depends on the
counselling and support services that she receives in the Unit-
ed States." 5 These services are essential to combat the physi-
cal and psychological effects of the abuse she suffered, such as
arthritis, hypertension and heart disease."' Although com-
munity support services are crucial to Ms. Rivera's recovery,
these services are unavailable in El Salvador. "'
Third, appellant's brief argues that deportation would
cause Ms. Rivera extreme hardship because it forecloses access
to U.S. courts and the criminal justice system. "' In the past,
Ms. Rivera successfully used the criminal justice system to
gain police protection and to obtain a temporary restraining or-
der against her husband. These options might be unavail-
able in El Salvador.
Furthermore, deportation would deny Ms. Rivera the abili-
ty to seek legal redress against her husband for his crimes."
A primary goal of the VAWA is to punish perpetrators and pre-
Appelants Brief, supra note 118, at 23-24.
1 Appellant's Brief, supra note 118, at 23-24.
... Appellants Brief, supra note 118, at 24.
1 See BROWNE, supra note 28, at 124.
'= Appellants Brief, supra note 118, at 24.
1, Appelant's Brief, supra note 118, at 24.
x" Appellants Brief, supra note 118, at 24-25 (citing CAROLINE KNAPP, A
PLAGUE OF MURDERS: OPEN SEASON ON WOMEN (1992); Lori Heise et al., Violence
Against Women: The Hidden Health Burden, WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS NO.
255 (1994); Physicians and Domestic Violence: Ethical Considerations, TRENDS IN
HEALTH CARE LAW & ETHICS, SPRING 1993, at 48).
14 Appellant's Brief, supra note 118, at 25.
"T Appellant's Brief, supra note 118, at 25.
140 Appellant's Brief, supra note 118, at 25-26.
Appellant's Brief, supra note 118, at 27.
Appellant's Brief, supra note 118, at 26-27.
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vent them from committing future offenses."' 1 When the gov-
ernment deports women like Ms. Rivera, it keeps them from
pursuing criminal actions that punish their abusers. Thus, the
government implicitly condones an abuser's actions by de-
porting his alien spouse and allowing the abuser to escape
punishment.
Fourth, appellant's brief proposes that deportation would
leave Ms. Rivera unprotected from the risk of future abuse.5 2
This risk arises when battered women attempt to leave abu-
sive relationships.' 3 Indeed, abusive relationships often be-
come more violent at separation, which heightens the difficulty
for battered women seeking to escape from their abusers.'
At the separation juncture, batterers strive to reassert their
power and control.'55 An abuser's familiarity with his wife's
habits, family members and friends, enables him easily to
stalk and harass her.55
Successful separation, therefore, depends on strong com-
munity support systems that involve local police, prosecutors,
shelter workers and judges who work with the abused
alien.'57 Support systems enhance protection of battered
women who flee from their abusers and facilitates their recov-
ery.'58 Ms. Rivera's support network is evident in her use of
local police and her reliance on friends and associates. 9 If
deported, Ms. Rivera's network will disappear. Moreover, it is
unlikely that her distance from her husband in El Salvador
will assure her security. Batterers go to great lengths to per-
petuate their domination, which might include travelling to
their wives' country of deportation or extending abuse through
a surrogate, such as a relative in that country. 6 '
". Appellant's Brief, supra note 118, at 25-26; see S. REP. No. 138, 103d Cong,
1st Sess. 38, 41 (1993).
152 Appellant's Brief, supra note 118, at 27.
' Appellant's Brief, supra note 118, at 27.
"' Appellant's Brief, supra note 118, at 27-28; see BROWNE, supra note 28, at
114-15.
... Appellant's Brief, supra note 118, at 28.
" Appellant's Brief, supra note 118, at 29.
.s Appellant's Brief, supra note 118, at 28-29.
" Appellant's Brief, supra note 118, at 29-30.
.. Appellant's Brief, supra note 118, at 30.
"~ Appellants Brief, supra note 118, at 30; see BROWNE, supra note 28, at 115
(explaining that "[vjiolent men do search desperately for their partners once the
woman leaves .... If they believe the woman has left town, they frequently at-
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BATTERED IMMIGRANT WOMEN
Fifth, appellant's brief notes that the circumstances and
conditions in the country of deportation for domestic violence
victims will cause Ms. Rivera extreme hardship because El
Salvador lacks protection for domestic violence victims.' Al-
though Salvadoran women face a growing trend of physical
violence, the Salvadoran legal system does little to prevent
abuse.'62 Appellants brief maintains that to deport Ms.
Rivera from a country with a developed system of protective
and social services to one lacking in such services would be an
extreme hardship."
Rivera-Gomez demonstrates how abuse factors can illumi-
nate a battered woman's qualifications for relief from deporta-
tion. On June 17, 1996, the Board of Immigration Appeals
remanded Rivera-Gomez, finding that the immigration judge
improperly prevented Ms. Rivera from presenting evidence to
support her immigration claims." Ms. Rivera has subse-
quently been granted suspension of deportation."
While the INS regulations encourage adjudicators to em-
ploy abuse factors, the regulations cannot guarantee that these
factors will shape an adjudicator's judgment. In order to real-
ize Congress' VAWA goals, the INS must take greater steps to
educate adjudicators about domestic violence and the role
abuse plays in deterring women from leaving abusive relation-
ships. On April 16, 1996, the INS circulated a memorandum to
INS offices briefly describing the VAWA and its interpretive
regulations. 6 Nevertheless, more training is required to en-
sure that adjudicators evaluate VAWA claims in the context of
abuse.
tempt to follow her, traveling to all locations they think she might be found. She
is theirs.").
... Appellants Brief, supra note 118, at 31.32.
12 Appellants Brief, supra note 118, at 32.
16 Appellants Brief, supra note 118, at 31.
16 In re Rivera-Gomez, File No. A 70 922 256 (BIA 1996).
6 In re Rivera-Gomez, Order of the Immigration Judge, File No. A 70 922 256
(Jan. 22, 1997).
13 Aleinikoff Memorandum, supra note 85.
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B. The Good Moral Character Standard
Like the extreme hardship requirement, VAWA's good
moral character standard should be evaluated in the abuse
context. Both VAWA self-petitioners and cancellation of remov-
al applicants must establish their good moral character."7
The good moral character requirement, an element of the tra-
ditional suspension of deportation application since 1940,'"
"was charted by assessing the current mores of the community.
It did not demand moral excellence, but rather adherence to
the moral standards of the average person. In one aspect the
term doubtless contemplated an absence of proven miscon-
duct."6 9 Courts will preclude aliens from demonstrating good
moral character if they have been convicted in a court of law
for committing certain classes of offenses, including serious
crimes and narcotics violations, as well as polygamy and pros-
titution.70
Under INS VAWA regulations, good moral character must
be determined on a case-by-case basis and judged according to
the standard of the "average citizen in the community." 7 1
The regulations give immigration adjudicators greater flexi-
bility to consider extenuating circumstances in cases that do
not involve convictions.17 ' For example, prostitutes who plea
bargain, and thus avoid a court-of-law determination, may still
qualify for self-petition approval if surrounding circumstances
demonstrate that their conduct was the result of abuse.
Despite this apparent flexibility, immigration advocates fear
that VAWA applicants will be denied relief based on arrests
arising out of domestic violence. 74
167 8 U.S.CA. §§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii), (A)(iv), (B)(ii); 1229b(b)(2)(B) (West Supp.
1997).
16 CHARLES GORDON & STANLEY MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §
74.03 [6] [El [iv] (1992).
169 Id.
17' The list of offenses that can preclude an alien from establishing good moral
character include: polygamy, prostitution, smuggling aliens, guilt for an aggravated
felony, commission of a crime of moral turpitude, narcotics violations, petty offens-
es, illegal gambling, fraudulent testimony before the INS, and habitual drunken-
ness. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (1994).
171 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vii) (1997).
172 Id.
173 Id.
17' Telephone Interview with Gail Pendleton, Coordinator of the National Immi-
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In the domestic violence context, battered women are often
arrested through no fault of their own. Sometimes police, act-
ing pursuant to mandatory arrest statutes, arrest both the
abuser and the abused when responding to domestic violence
emergency calls.' In other cases, police arrest battered
women based on counter charges asserted by arrested abus-
ers. 
76
In one currently pending VAWA self-petition case, an alien
woman, Constance, 7 was arrested for assaulting her hus-
band when she left her child with him for visitation.' In
truth, Constance's husband attacked her.' When Constance
reported his conduct to the authorities, a police clerk indicated
that her husband had already filed an assault charge, and soon
after she was arrested."0 Despite the charge's fabrication,
Constance's attorneys fear that the immigration service, look-
ing at the charge without considering the circumstances behind
it, will preclude Constance from establishing good moral char-
acter.'l '
Even when arrest records accurately reflect a woman's
conduct, adjudicators should consider such acts in the context
of abuse. Battered women's advocates have successfully argued
gration Project of the National Lawyers Guild (Apr. 28, 1997) [hereinafter
Pendleton Interview].
"75 See Joan Zorza, Women Battering: High Costs and the State of the Law, 28
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 383, 387 (1994) (noting the unintended consequences of man-
datory arrest laws).
"' Pendleton Interview, supra note 174; cf Zorza, supra note 175, at 392 (dis-
cussing the harms caused by mutual protection orders which "label both parties as
abusers, conveying the message to the parties and the world that they were each
to blame for the abuse").
" Constance is a pseudonym for a client of Marianthe Poulianos, an immigra-
tion attorney in New York City. Interview with Marianthe Poulianos, Esq., in New
York, N.Y. (May 20, 1997) [hereinafter Poulianos Interview).
180 Id.*7 IcL
"I Poulianos Interview, supra note 177. Constance's attorney noted that the
immigration examiner interviewing Constance asked many questions about her ar-
rests and seemed to indicate that these arrests might influence the outcome of
Constance's case. Constance's attorney had to intervene during the interview to
explain the circumstances of the arrest to avoid the impression that Constance
lacked good moral character.
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that a woman's violent acts may be rooted in self-defense."'
Indeed, battered women mostly cite self-defense as the motive
for their violent acts."8
Moreover, adjudicators should consider circumstances of
abuse when confronted with women held criminally liable for
their inaction-for example, women liable for child neglect.8"'
Up to seventy percent of the families which experience spousal
abuse also experience child abuse.18 In some families just
one parent abuses the children, in others both parents are re-
sponsible for the abuse. 8 ' While courts have moved away
from holding both parents liable for abuse, many states still
find the non-abuser strictly liable for child neglect.8 7 Bat-
tered women are often blamed for their child's victimization
even when they have not harmed the child themselves. 88
182 See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J. 1984) (noting that "[oinly by
understanding the [ ] unique pressures that force battered women to remain with
their mates, despite their long-standing and reasonable fear of severe bodily harm
and the isolation that being a battered woman creates, can a battered woman's
state of mind be accurately and fairly understood."); see also Schneider & Jordan,
supra note 21, at 150 (asserting that judges and juries should consider the "vari-
ety of societally-based factors" that elucidate the reasonableness of a woman's
actions to physically defend herself).
13 Daniel G. Saunders, Wife Abuse, Husband Abuse, or Mutual Combat?, in
FEINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 90, 107 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd
eds., 1988).
'" Lee Teran & Barbara Hines, Suspension of Deportation as Relief for Battered
Immigrant Women and Children, IMMIGR. NEwSL., July 1995, at 12 (noting that
the INS may consider the "alleged endangerment to a child or failure of a parent
to protect children from the other parent's battery and cruelty" as the basis for
denying good moral character).
i Cahn, supra note 49, at 1056.
188 Cahn, supra note 49, at 1056-57 (stating that "children in these [abusive]
families may be abused by both parents. One study found that women who are
abused are twice as likely to abuse their children as women who are not abused.")
(citing M. STRAuS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN AIERICAN FAMILIES
216-17 (1980)).
," In re Glenn G., 154 Misc. 2d 677, 587 N.Y.S.2d 464 (Family Ct. Kings Coun-
ty 1992), is one example of a judicial decision-though arrived at reluctant-
ly--convicting a battered woman who, despite overwhelming efforts to protect her
children, was found neglectful on the basis of strict liability. Even though holding
Mrs. G. negligent, Judge Sara Schecter emphasized that Mrs. G. suffered from
battered woman's syndrome. Id. at 688, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 470. She stated that
"[tihis court is in accord with those who have recognized that Battered Woman's
Syndrome is a condition which seriously impairs the will and the judgment of the
victim." Id. Yet, despite this recognition Judge Schecter was compelled to find Mrs.
G. negligent under the strict liability statute. Id.
88 See Marie Ashe & Naomi Calm, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theo-
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Like abused women generally, a number of reasons may
explain why battered immigrant women are unable to protect
their children and fail to report abuse.s By taking action
against her abuser, a battered woman may place her own life
in danger.'c Moreover, an abuser may threaten to have her
deported if she reports him to the police.r"*
In light of the harsh and unjust consequences of the strict
liability statutes, some states have modified these laws to
account for abuse circumstances faced by battered women. For
example, the Minnesota Criminal Code provides a defense to
its strict liability statute for women who reasonably believe
that taking steps to stop the child abuse would cause substan-
tial bodily harm to themselves.' The Minnesota statute is
indicative of a trend recognizing the unique circumstances
influencing the actions of battered women.
The VAWA, in fact, attempts to alleviate the immigration
concerns which prevent battered immigrant women from re-
porting child abuse and removing their children from family
violence.'93 According to the VAWA, an alien spouse can self-
ry, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 75 (1993) (discussing the Hedda Nussbaum case which
involved a battered woman who was also the adoptive mother of a six-year old
child who was killed as a result of a violent attack by her adoptive father).
Nussbaum has been described as both "a person so victimized as to be incapable
of moral agency" and "an active participant in her own-and Lisa's (Nussbaum's
daughter's]-destruction." Id. at 85. The authors also refer to Alice Miller, who
offers a particularly unforgiving perspective of battered women:
The situation of an adult woman confronted by a brutal man is not the
same as that of a small child. Although, because of her childhood, the
woman can see herself as equally helpless and thus may overlook her
chances of defense, she is in fact no longer helpless. Even when her
rights are inadequate, even when the courts are on the side of the man,
an adult woman can speak up, report, look for allies, and she can
scream (assuming she hasn't, as a child, learned not to).
Id. at 96. Ashe and Cahn also offer arguments illuminating the actions and inac-
tions of battered women. They refer to Martha Minow who recommends reassess-
ing the conduct of "bad mothers" in light of complex family dynamics and a soci-
ety unresponsive to domestic violence. Id. at 100 (citing Martha Minow, Words at
the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND.
L. REV. 1665, 1682-83 (1990)).
See Ashe & Calm, supra note 188, at 109.
190 See Ashe & Cahn, supra note 188, at 109.
... See Howard Davidson, The Impact of Domestic Violence on Children, ABA
CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, Oct. 1994, at 19-20.
M NN. STAT. ANN. § 609.378(2) (West Supp. 1996).
11 H.R. REP. NO. 395, 103d Cong., 1st Seas. 38 (1993).
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petition for lawful permanent residence or acquire cancellation
of removal if her child has been battered or subject to extreme
cruelty."9 This allows a battered immigrant woman to take
action to protect her child without fearing immigration conse-
quences.
A battered woman's failure to report or stop child abuse
should not universally be a strike against her capacity to es-
tablish good moral character. As with current trends modifying
child neglect statutes, adjudicators should look behind the
inaction of women charged with child neglect before making
moral character judgments.
Only by evaluating VAWA standards, such as extreme
hardship and good moral character, within the abuse frame-
work, will VAWA meet its intended goal-helping battered
women leave abusive relationships. Without incorporating
abuse factors into VAWA evaluations, adjudicators may over-
look crucial components of a battered woman's hardship and
misconstrue an alien's inaction for moral failure.
C. The Poverty Hurdle
In addition to the hurdles within VAWA's standards, many
battered immigrant women are prevented from leaving abusive
husbands because of their poverty. As discussed in Part I,
abusers use economic isolation to further their power and con-
trol."' Isolation tactics deter battered women from finding or
maintaining employment, developing marketable skills, and
building community ties. 9 ' As a result, battered women are
left financially dependent on their abusers.
Immigration law heightens an alien's financial dependence
by requiring aliens to demonstrate the ability to "rely on their
own capabilities and the resources of their families, their spon-
sors, and private organizations.""7 Aliens unable to provide
these assurances may be found to be inadmissible as burdens
on society,"' or "public charges." "' Consequently, battered
194 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(ii), 1229b(b)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
' See Dalton, supra note 7.
See Dalton, supra note 7, at 334-36.
8 5 U.S.C.A. § 1601(2)(A) (West Supp. 1997) (codifying § 553 of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 26).
198 The fear of allowing indigent aliens into the United States can be traced
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immigrant women who cannot show economic independence
because of their financial isolation are left to rely on their
abusive husbands to avoid public charge classification. More-
over, VAWA applicants who are willing and able to work may
not have the opportunity to do so because the INS has not
guaranteed employment authorization to all individuals seek-
ing relief under the VAWA."'
1. Public Charge Ground for Inadmissibility
Up to half of government denials of immigrant and non-
immigrant applications are based on the public charge ground
for exclusion.2"' In determining whether an alien might be-
come a public charge, the INS considers the following factors:
age, physical or mental disability, education, work history and
number of dependents. 2 Ultimately, aliens must prove their
financial independence to avoid public charge classification.'
Typically, evidence of one's own financial worth or that of a
sponsoring U.S. resident can counter this classification.'
back to this country's roots. Provisions in the Articles of Confederation called for
the exclusion of "paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice7 from American
shores. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law
(1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1846 (1993) (citation omitted). It was feared
that America would become the encampment for European indigents, threatening
the image Americans wanted for their country: a place for the honest and hard-
working. Id. at 1847. The current political climate reflects how little has changed
in 220 years. Over the past year, three major anti-immigrant legislative initiatives
have been passed into law: the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, supra note 82; the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1996, supra note 26; and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act of 1996, supra note 3.
" Public charge is one of nine grounds for inadmissibility. 8 U.S.CA
§ 1182(a)(4) (West Supp. 1997); see supra note 3 (enumerating the eight other
grounds for exclusion). Grounds for inadmissibility will primarily affect self-peti-
tioners, not cancellation of removal claimants. Indeed, to apply for cancellation of
removal, one must be deportable. 8 U.S.C-A. § 1229b (West Supp. 1997).
See infra Part III.C.2.
201 See Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of
Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1521
(1995) (citation omitted).
202 See Elizabeth Ruddick, Public Charge and Battered Immigrant Women, in
MATERIALS ON IMIGRATION RELIEF 1 (1995) (available from the National Immigra-
tion Project of the National Lawyers Guild).
2'3 GORDON & MAIlMAN, supra note 168, § 61.05[4].
204 GORDON & MAILIMAN, supra note 168, § 61.05[51; DeSousa v. Day, 22 F.2d
472, 473 (2d Cir. 1927); United States ex rel. Engel v. Tod, 294 F. 820, 824 (2d
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Public charge determination-which is prospec-
tive-threatens aliens who may require public benefits in the
future.0 5 Consequently, battered immigrant women who
have been stripped of financial independence are particularly
vulnerable to public charge classification because of their po-
tential need for benefits. This risk is heightened for undocu-
mented women who successfully access the limited public bene-
fits available to illegal aliens because current receipt of bene-
fits creates a presumption of future need.0 '
Illustrating the harsh consequences of the public charge
classification is the example of Elena,0 7 a native and citizen
of the Dominican Republic seeking to gain immigrant status in
the United States through VAWA's self-petition provision.0 '
Elena was nine months pregnant when she decided to leave
her husband, a native of Puerto Rico, after a brutal as-
sault. °9 Although Elena is a physician by profession,21 she
neither speaks English nor has an American license to practice
medicine.2 ' Without other relatives in the United States,
Elena currently lives with another single mother.1 Elena's
Cir. 1923); In re Day, 27 F. 678, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1886).
2- 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1994) (stating that any alien "likely at any time to
become a public charge is inadmissible").
2o8 See Ruddick, supra note 202, at 2-3 (suggesting that the particular purpose
of the public benefits received by the alien is a critical factor for determining
immigration implications). Public assistance supplementing a recipients standard of
living, such as free school lunches, vocational training, rent subsidies and food
stamps, are inconsequential. On the other hand, Aid to Families with Dependent
Children ("AFDC"), Old Age Assistance, and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI")
are relevant to public charge classifications. Ruddick, supra note 202, at 2-3.
Ruddick notes, however, that "receipt of cash benefits . . . is not conclusive proof
of likelihood of becoming a public charge." Ruddick, supra note 202, at 3. Ruddick
argues that they are just part of the assessment of circumstances determining
public charge classification. Ruddick, supra note 202, at 3. Ruddick cites In re A-,
19 I. & N. Dec. 867 (1989) (finding woman not to be a public charge because her
minimal work history and receipt of public assistance were "temporary circum-
stances 'beyond the control of the alien'"), and In re Perez, 15 I. & N. Dec. 136
(1974) (determining that public charge classification does not apply to a 28 year-
old mother of three receiving welfare because she was healthy and "in the prime
of her life"), as two examples of welfare recipients granted legal status).
20" See Poulianos Interview, supra note 177. "Elena" is a pseudonym for a client
of Marianthe Poulianos.
208 Poulianos Interview, supra note 177.
29 Poulianos Interview, supra note 177.
210 Poulianos Interview, supra note 177.
21 Poulianos Interview, supra note 177.
212 Poulianos Interview, supra note 177.
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attorneys fear that her ability to adjust status to lawful perma-
nent resident might be jeopardized on public charge grounds
because of her need for public assistance." 3
The BIA requires that public charge determinations en-
compass the "totality of the circumstances."2 4 Immigration
officials, when reviewing VAWA applications, should recognize
that a battered woman's inability to work and achieve financial
independence is directly related to power and control tools,
such as forced isolation and harassment, used by abusers to
subjugate their spouses.1 5 Without personal financial
resources, battered women may need public assistance to es-
cape abusive relationships.216 Yet, a battered spouse's depen-
dence on public assistance is temporary, and most battered
women become self-sufficient within two years.2 7 Battered
women who demonstrate the desire to become productive mem-
bers of society should be excused from public charge classifica-
tion.21
8
2. New Economic Hurdles
Even if the need for public assistance does not result in
public charge classification, the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity of 199621 (the "Welfare Act") heightens a
battered immigrant women's economic reliance on her hus-
band. By restricting public benefits available to aliens,' the
Welfare Act augments a battered woman's dependence on her
" Poulianos Interview, supra note 177. See infra Part HLC.2 for a fuller dis-
cussion of benefits available to legal and illegal aliens.
214 In re Perez, 15 I. & N. Dec. 136, 137 (1974).
215 See Dalton, supra note 7, at 334; see also Zorza, supra note 175, at 386
(remarking that "[mlost battered women do not leave [abusive relationships] be-
cause they have no housing, child care, or money, and they justifiably fear retalia-
tion against themselves and their children if they leave").
21. See Ruddick, supra note 202, at 5 (recognizing that 'a temporary recourse to
public assistance is often the only alternative to returning to the relationship").
21" Ruddick, supra note 202, at 6 (citation omitted). Demonstrating this point,
Elena, who received employment authorization subsequent to filing her VAWA self-
petition, now supports herself through her work as a counsellor at a community
mental health center. Poulianos Interview, supra note 177; see text accompanying
note 208.
218 In re Martinez-Lopez, 10 . & N. Dec. 409 (A.G. 1964).
212 See supra note 26.
8o  U.S.C.A. §§ 1183a, 1601, 1611-13, 1621-22, 1631-32, 1641-45 (West Supp.
1997).
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husband in order to meet basic needs. Congress, however,
amended the Welfare Act through provisions in IIRIRA to pro-
tect battered women from the Welfare Act's harsher provi-
sions. 1 Some battered immigrant women are now included
among the list of "qualified aliens" still eligible for public bene-
fits.22
2
In truth, all aliens-legal and illegal-continue to be eligi-
ble for some federal public benefits such as emergency medical
assistance and disaster relief.223 Qualified aliens are eligible
for additional assistance, which includes social service benefits
intended to aid poor families with children, disabled individu-
als and domestic violence victims. 2' However, the benefits
for which qualified aliens are eligible represent a fraction of
21 Minty Sui Chung, Public Benefits, New Welfare Restrictions and Battered
Immigrant Women and Children, in DOMESTIc VIOLENCE IN IMMIGRANT AND
REFUGEE COMMUNITIES: ASSERTING THE RIGHTS OF BATrERED WOMEN ch. 9 (De-
eana L. Jang et al. eds., 1997) (discussing provisions in the Welfare Act which
implicate the lives of battered immigrant women). In addition to explaining new
public benefits limitations, Chung also outlines affidavit of support and deeming
rules under IIRIRA. Id. This source is available from the Family Violence and
Prevention Fund.
2 Id.; 8 U.S.C.A. § 1641(c) (West Supp. 1997). Battered immigrants become
"qualified aliens" by demonstrating that: (A) they have been "battered or subjected
to extreme cruelty in the United States by a spouse or a parent, or by a member
of the spouse or parent's family residing in the same household" and that there is
a "substantial connection between the abuse and the need for assistance," id.
§ 1641(c)(1)(A); and (B) they have a pending or approved relative-petition, VAWA
self-petition, or VAWA cancellation of removal application. Id. § 1641(c)(1)(B). Alien
parents of battered children may also meet the "qualified alien" requirement so
long as they did not actively participate in the abuse and there is a substantial
connection between the abuse and the need for benefits. Id. § 1641(c)(2). Other
'qualified aliens" include: lawful permanent residents, asylees, refugees, parolees,
withholding of deportation beneficiaries, and conditional residents. Id. § 1641(b).
" 8 U.S.C.A. § 1611(b) (West Supp. 1997). Benefits protected by this section
include: emergency medical assistance; short-term, non-cash, in-kind emergency
disaster relief; public health assistance for immunizations; community-level, in-kind
programs, services and assistance specified by the Attorney General that are nec-
essary for the protection of life and safety; and housing programs for aliens utiliz-
ing such programs on August 22, 1996.
224 Id. § 1612(b)(3). These benefits include temporary assistance for needy fami-
lies ("TANF), which, like Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC"), as-
sists poor families with children; social service block grants, which provide pro-
grams for child care, disabled individuals and victims of domestic violence; and
Medicaid.
Note that the Welfare Act imposes time limits and work requirements for
TANF eligibility. Chung, supra note 221. States acting before July 1997 may
waive these requirements under the Welfare Act's Family Violence Option for
domestic violence victims. Chung, supra note 221.
[Vol. 62:1595
BATTERED IMMIGRANT WOMEN
those once available to all lawful permanent residents. ' Sig-
nificantly, most qualified aliens can no longer receive supple-
mental security insurance or food stamps.' Moreover, eligi-
bility does not guarantee access to benefits. The Welfare Act
grants states the discretion to impose stringent eligibility re-
quirements that may preclude qualified aliens from receiving
the benefits. 7
While the Welfare Act limits alien access to public bene-
fits, the exceptions for battered immigrant women suggest a
positive message. By creating exceptions, Congress overtly
acknowledged the importance of benefits to battered women. It
is curious and disappointing that Congress, having recognized
this need, stopped short of providing battered immigrant wom-
en with the full panoply of benefits available to other protected
classes of immigrants.' Why not include battered immigrant
women among these groups?
Furthermore, the recognition of abuse-factors inherent in
the Welfare Act exceptions have meaning for public charge
evaluations. Adjudicators, who might otherwise disqualify a
VAWA applicant on public charge grounds, should acknowl-
edge, as Congress has in the Welfare Act, that the financial
concerns of battered immigrant women are unique. The very
' Pre-Welfare Act benefits available to many lawful permanent residents in-
clude AFDC, Medicaid and food stamps. Chung, supra note 221. Prior to the Wel-
fare Act's passage, states could not discriminate against lawful permanent resi-
dents in granting welfare benefits. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (ar-
ticulating substantive due process rights of lawful permanent residents).
"' 8 U.S.C.A. § 1612(a)(3) (West Supp. 1997). Three limited categories of aliens
are excused from this rule: (1) refugees, asylees, and withholding of deportation
beneficiaries; (2) permanent residents who have worked 40 qualifying quarters in
the United States; and (3) alien veterans, aliens on active duty in the military,
and the spouses and unmarried children of these individuals. Id. § 1612(a)(2).
Aliens in categories one and three, who gain status after August 22, 1996, are
also not subject to the five-year requirement for federal means-tested programs. Id.
§ 1613(b).
Id § 1612(b). Furthermore, qualified aliens who gain status after August 22,
1996, are ineligible for federal means-tested programs for five years. Id. § 1613(a).
Exempt from the five-year restriction are the federal programs available to all
aliens, which are listed above, and programs providing school lunches, child nutri-
tion, foster care and adoption assistance, elementary and secondary school educa-
tion, head start, and job training. Id. § 1613(c)(2).
SId. § 1612(a)(2); see supra note 226.
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benefits that Congress admits are needed by abused aliens
should not be public charge classification barriers for VAWA
applicants.
While public benefits may help a battered immigrant wom-
an leave an abusive relationship, employment authorization is
an essential tool for gaining economic independence. The
March 26, 1996 interim rule229 outlines circumstances under
which VAWA self-petitioners can acquire employment authori-
zation." ° The rule points out that self-petitioners immediate-
ly eligible for adjustment of status may qualify to work.23' Al-
though this provision only encompasses immediate relatives of
U.S. citizens, the rule suggests that self-petitioning spouses of
lawful permanent residents may also obtain employment au-
thorization by requesting voluntary departure or being placed
in deferred action status."2 These avenues are available to
aliens who demonstrate compelling circumstances and their
need to work. 3 Under IIRIRA, though, aliens can no longer
acquire work authorization through voluntary departure.234
Therefore, their only recourse is deferred action, which is
granted at the discretion of the INS.2I
A battered woman's poverty, nevertheless, remains a dou-
ble hurdle obstructing her way to independence. First, if the
government forecasts that a self-petitioner will become a public
charge, she will be unable to adjust her status to lawful per-
manent resident. Second, if a battered immigrant woman's
VAWA application succeeds, she may not have the financial
resources as a lawful resident to live a life economically inde-
61 Fed. Reg. 13061 (1996).
no Id. at 13070-71. While not all VAWA self-petitioners are eligible for employ-
ment authorization, cancellation of removal applicants may receive this relief. 8
C.F.R. § 274a.12(10) (1997).
2s 61 Fed. Reg. at 13071 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(9)).
Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(12), (14), respectively).
8'  C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(12), (14).
s Gail Pendleton, Immigration Relief for Women and Children Suffering Abuse,
in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN IIIGRANT AND REFUGEE COMMUNITIES: ASSERTING THE
RIGHTS OF BATrERED WOMEN ch. 7 (Deeana L. Jang et al. eds., 1997) (stating that
the "1996 immigration law eliminates voluntary departure as an option" for gain-
ing employment authorization). Pendleton adds that voluntary departure relief,
under IIRIRA, expires after four months. Id. Aliens who stay in the United States
beyond this period may be barred from gaining lawful permanent residence for ten
years and face $1,000 to $5,000 fines. Id.
211 Id.
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pendent from her abuser. Consequently, the public charge
ground for inadmissibility, along with the welfare restrictions,
perpetuate a batterer's domination through economic control.
CONCLUSION
The Violence Against Women Act immigration provisions
combined with INS regulations uproot the coverture frame-
work in United States immigration policy. The VAWA provi-
sions make enormous strides toward removing a key tool-the
relative-petition-used by batterers to shackle immigrant wom-
en to abusive relationships. INS regulations further VAWA's
goals by stipulating that any credible evidence related to abuse
will be considered when VAWA claims are evaluated by immi-
gration adjudicators.
Indeed, VAWA's implementation rests in the hands of
adjudicators. Even the most progressive laws and regulations
cannot ensure that circumstances of abuse will be considered
when VAWA immigration claims are reviewed. Educating
adjudicators about the dynamics of abuse and training them to
evaluate VAWA claims in context of domestic violence is essen-
tial to ensuring the VAWA's success.
Moreover, while yesterday's Congress, through the passage
of the VAWA, extended a hand to battered women escaping
intimate violence, today's Congress, through welfare reform,
locks them in abusive relationships. The VAWA does not reme-
dy the financial hurdles battered immigrant women face when
fleeing abuse. The public charge ground for inadmissibility in
concert with the lack of public benefits promotes a system
which incarcerates battered women in abusive relationships
because of their poverty.
Ryan Lilienthal*
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